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Introduction
On October 5, when the U.S. Supreme Court hears Salman v. United States,1
it will focus on the role of the "personal benefit" test in insider trading law for
the first time since the test was established in the now iconic 1983 case Dirks v.
SEC 2 Dirks reaffirmed the principle that trading on the basis of material
nonpublic information is not a crime unless it involves a breach of a duty of
trust and confidence to the owner of the information being traded.3 The Court
in Dirks went on to establish the important principle, recently fortified in the
notable Second Circuit case United States v. Newman,4 that a tipper has
committed no breach of fiduciary duty unless he receives a personal benefit in
exchange for the disclosure.5
This Essay maintains that the SEC has persistently sought to minimize the
role of the personal benefit test in insider trading law, thereby stretching the
limits of its delegated power under securities law. It also contends that the SEC
categorically rejects the theory, embraced by the Supreme Court and the
Second Circuit in Newman and reflected in the personal benefit est, that
tipping by insiders is sometimes not just benign, but also decidedly curative for
capital market imperfections.
Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance and Securities Law, Yale
Law School, and Professor, Yale School of Management.
1. October Term 2016, Sup. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalOc
tober2016.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2016). Salman is an appeal from the Ninth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
899 (2016). In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that to establish tippee liability in insider
trading cases, it is sufficient for the government to show that there was a close family
relationship between the tipper and the tippee. Id. at 1094.
2. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
3. Id. at 657-58.
4. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015).
5. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662; Newman, 773 F.3d at 446.
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I. Background on the Law and Economics of Insider Trading
Inside information is the same as other forms of intellectual property in
that it is susceptible to theft by unscrupulous agents.6 Applying the law of
insider trading is a process of determining who owns a particular piece of
information and then protecting that property right from pilfering by others.7
Determining who owns a piece of information in this context is quite easy. The
owner of information about a company is the person or firm who creates the
information, just as the owner of a patent is the person who invented the
gadget or process receiving the patent.8
The government, however, does not limit itself to prosecuting only those
who steal information from the companies to which it belongs. The
government also seeks to regulate and/or forbid any trading on this
information before it is public, regardless of how the trader obtained the
information in the first place. For example, the SEC has promulgated a rule
requiring any company that makes a tender offer for the shares of another firm
to disclose publicly all sorts of information about itself and its plans
simultaneously with making the bid.9 Such a rule ignores the bidding firm's
property rights in its information for no reason other than that the SEC thinks
requiring disclosure is somehow "fairer."10
At the moment, the battle between the executive and the judicial branches
over the contours of insider trading law is focused on a single question:
whether it is ever, under any circumstances, permissible for a corporate insider
(tipper) to pass along confidential information to an outsider (tippee). Based on
the positions that they have taken in litigation, the SEC and the Justice
Department believe that providing insider tips of material, nonpublic
6. Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract The New Direction of the Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 9, 27 (1984) (arguing that Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980) recognized that inside information is the same as other forms of
intellectual property, and that insider trading law protects property rights in
information from arrogation by those in positions of trust and confidence that give
them access to such information).
7. See id. (explaining goals of insider trading law).
8. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have Power ... [to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries...." See generally Henry E.
Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE
L.J., 1742, 1799-817 (2007) (explaining certain differences between the more tort-like
copyright regime and the more property-like patent law regime).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2015).
10. In this context, the term "fairness" is defined as eliminating any asymmetries of
information between a trader and her counterparty. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 448-49
("Although the Government might like the law to be different, nothing in the law
requires a symmetry of information in the nation's securities markets.").
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information to people who trade on that information constitutes civil or
criminal fraud unless it is first disclosed.11 The Supreme Court and lower
federal courts, in contrast, believe that there are several contexts in which
insiders legally can pass along insider information because doing so furthers a
legitimate corporate purpose. 12
Suppose, for example, that an insider is working in a company mired in
fraud and illegal activities. Unable to get the authorities or press interested or
involved, the insider passes along his concerns to a securities analyst who does
his own investigation, verifies the fraud, and, putting his money where his
mouth is, sells stock in the fraudulent firm. This simultaneously drives the
company's share price down and notifies the market that something is amiss in
the company. The SEC would brand the trader in this hypothetical a fraudster
and seek to sanction her. 13 It might even ask the Department of Justice to bring
criminal charges against the trader and or the person who provided the tip to
the trader. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, reasoning that having
securities analysts ferret out fraud is a good thing that should be encouraged,
rejected the SEC's contention that the tipper in a case similar to this
hypothetical committed fraud in Dirks.14
Apart from exposing fraud and other illegality, corporate insiders promote
a variety of legitimate corporate purposes by leaking information to securities
analysts. For example, in Newman, a case involving tips by corporate insiders
who were casual acquaintances of financial analysts who passed the tips along
to hedge fund traders,15 the defendants established that it was common for
11. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 447 ("By selectively parsing this dictum, the Government seeks
to revive the absolute bar on tippee trading that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected
in Dirks."). In Dirks, the SEC's litigation position "differ[ed] little from the view that [the
Supreme Court] rejected as inconsistent with congressional intent in Chiarella," which
was that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material
nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities without
incurring an affirmative duty to disclose." Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 656 (1983)
(quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978)). The SEC
"maintain[ed] that anyone who knowingly receive[d] nonpublic material information
from an insider ha[d] a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading." Id.
12. For example, in Newman, the court quoted United States v. Chestman for the proposition
that "[tihe policy rationale [for prohibiting insider trading] stops well short of
prohibiting all trading on material nonpublic information. Efficient capital markets
depend on the protection of property rights in information. However, they also require
that persons who acquire and act on information about companies be able to profit
from the information they generate...."773 F.3d at 449 (second alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J.,
concurring)). In Dirks, ferreting out fraud was considered a valid corporate purpose.
463 U.S. at 658, 658 n.18, 667.
13. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650-52.
14. Id. at 650-52, 667.
15. 773 F.3d at 451-54.
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insiders at Dell to disclose "confidential quarterly financial information
arguably similar to the inside information disclosed by [the Dell defendants] to
establish relationships with financial firms who might be in a position to buy
Dell's stock."16 Convincing investors to buy a company's stock is a legitimate
goal for a company official and a legitimate reason to provide tips, in other
words.
In Dirks, the Court established the personal benefit test as the tool to
distinguish wrongful insider trading that should be outlawed from insider
trading that is rightful because it reveals fraud or makes markets more
efficient. 17 The personal benefit that makes a trade illegal can take the form of
a briefcase full of cash clandestinely passed from tippee to tipper. It also can
take the form of a gift to a family member or close friend, as the Court made
clear in Dirks. 18
In light of the language in Dirks that "a gift of confidential information to a
trading relative" satisfies the Court's personal benefit test,19 the decision in
Salman that a bank employee who was found to have given his brother
confidential information-knowing that his brother would trade on that
information-was therefore guilty of committing insider trading,20 was
unremarkable and straightforward.
Indeed, the sheer banality of Salman leaves one to wonder why the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case at all. It is likely that the Court will be
urged to go even further and loosen-or worse, eliminate-the requirement
that prosecutors show that people accused of insider trading either provided
personal benefits or were family members of the tipper.2 1
16. Id. at 454-55.
17. 463 U.S at 661-64. Determining whether a tip is consistent with the tipper's fiduciary
duties, and thus consistent with the law ("good"), depends on whether the insider's "tip"
constituted a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty. This, in turn, depends largely on
whether the insider receives something as a result of the disclosure. Absent an
improper purpose, there is no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by
the insider, there is no derivative breach by the tipper. Id.
18. Id. at 664 (holding that a violation of the law occurs "when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend").
19. Id.
20. 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015).
21. Some have argued that Salman goes beyond Newman in that it "argu[es] that gifts of
inside information should be per se legal." Daniel N. Sang, Salman v. United States and
Insider Tipping: What Could Be Decided?, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE
SKY BLOG (June 17, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/06/17/
salman-v-united-states-and-insider-tipping-what-could-be-decided.
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II. The Personal Benefit Test and Tippee Liability
The SEC rejects the personal benefit test because it rejects the premise on
which it is based, which is that tipping by insiders in certain contexts is benign,
and sometimes even decidedly curative for capital market imperfections. If, as
the SEC has indicated, no valid social goal such as increased efficiency or less
fraud could be attained by decriminalizing some tipping and trading, then it
would make sense to ban all such activity. In other words, if all insider trading
is wrongful, there is no justification for the personal benefit est, which seeks
to distinguish wrongful insider trading from rightful insider trading. Only if at
least some trading is salutary and beneficial is there a need for a legal test-the
personal benefit test-to allow traders and courts to distinguish between
permissible and impermissible insider trading.22
The SEC has long maintained that no insider trading on the basis of tips is
permissible because "anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic material
information from an insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading."23
According to the SEC, regardless of whether a tipper has received a personal
benefit, or whether property rights and market efficiency were enhanced or
diminished by the tipping and trading, the tipper breached her fiduciary duty.
In sharp contrast, the Supreme Court distinguished illegal trading from
legal trading with great precision over thirty years ago in two now-iconic
cases: Chiarella v. United States24 and Dirks v. SEC 25 Chiarella held that an
element of the crime of insider trading is the breach of a duty of trust and
confidence toward the owner of the information being traded.26 Dirks held that
sharing corporate information is not a crime unless it involves a breach of such
a duty.27
The Supreme Court in Dirks and the Second Circuit in Newman explicitly
recognized that analysts and other researchers play a vital role in maintaining
properly functioning and efficient capital markets28 and that there are valid
reasons, consistent with the interests of shareholders, why corporate insiders
should disclose material, nonpublic information to stock market analysts and
22. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (holding that it is impermissible to trade on "information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit
of anyone" (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936
(1968)).
23. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656.
24. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
25. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
26. 445 U.S. at 227-35.
27. 463 U.S. at 657-60.
28. Id. at 657 n.16, 658-59; United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015) (quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d
Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring)).
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other capital market participants in advance of its general release to the
public.29
The SEC has shown, with its promulgation of Regulation FD30 and in its
litigation theory in Chiarella and Dirks,31 that it rejects the premise that tipping
should be decriminalized in certain contexts. Gomes, Gorton, and Madureira
show that Regulation FD increased the costs to companies of producing
information, which, in turn, negatively affected the asset prices of smaller
companies.32 As a result of Regulation FD, smaller companies tend to have less
analyst coverage,33 as analysts are less inclined to cover existing companies,
and companies that had analyst coverage when Regulation FD was
promulgated often lost such coverage and have experienced significant
increases in their costs of capital.34
With Regulation FD the SEC made illegal conduct that had been explicitly
condoned by the Supreme Court seventeen years earlier in Dirks when it noted
that what analysts do is "ferret out and analyze information,"35 and that "this
often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others
who are insiders."36 But for the fact that the SEC did not promulgate
Regulation FD until October 23, 2000,37 seventeen years after Dirks,3 8 the
29. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 ("Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts....-).
30. Regulation FD prohibits U.S. public companies from making selective, nonpublic
disclosures to analysts. Analysts pointed out that the rule would lead to fewer
disclosures and lower-quality analyst forecasts. It has degraded significantly the quality
and efficiency of the capital markets. Anup Agrawal, Sahiba Chadha & Mark A. Chen,
Who Is Afraid of Reg FD? The Behavior and Performance of Sell-Side Analysts Following the
SEC's Fair Disclosure Rules, 79 J. Bus. 2811, 2811-13 (2006).
31. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656 (noting that in Chiarella, the SEC maintained that "[a]nyone...
who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information
to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose" (quoting United
States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)), and
observing that "[hiere [in Dirks], the SEC maintains that anyone who knowingly
receives nonpublic material information from an insider has a fiduciary duty to
disclose before trading").
32. Armando Gomes, Gary Gorton & Leonardo Madureira, SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure,
Information, and the Cost of Capital, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 300, 301-02 (2007).
33. Id. at 315.
34. Id. at 315, 323-25.
35. 463 U.S. at 658 (quoting Securities Act Release No. 34-17479, 21 SEC Docket 1401, 1406
(Jan. 22, 1981)).
36. Id. at 658.
37. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
38. Dirks v. SECwas decided on July 1, 1983.463 U.S. at 646.
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Supreme Court might have been arguing specifically against Regulation FD in
Dirks when it noted that "[i]t is the nature of this type of information [i.e.,
information conveyed while 'meeting with and questioning corporate officers
and others who are insiders'] and indeed of the markets themselves, that such
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the
corporation's stockholders or the public generally."3 9
In the Court's world of law, selective disclosure can benefit investors and
capital markets by ferreting out fraud-as it did in Dirks40-or by encouraging
investor monitoring and moving capital market prices to reflect more
accurately underlying corporate values-as it did in Newman.41
Selective disclosure, however, can also undermine the integrity of capital
markets where insiders use undisclosed corporate information to their
personal advantage, without concern for the interests of the company to which
such information belongs. In these situations, "[tihe need for a ban on some
tippee trading is clear."42
Because the SEC does not distinguish between situations in which tipping
is done for valid corporate purposes and those in which tipping is done for
venal purposes, the SEC has never found a reason to distinguish between the
contexts in which tipping is appropriate and those in which it is not. In
contrast, because of its more nuanced and sophisticated view of the role of
insider tips to analysts, the Supreme Court in Dirks was compelled to craft the
personal benefit test to distinguish benign from malignant tipping.43
The personal benefit test is an expression of the view that the receipt by a
tippee of a personal benefit in exchange for her tip obviates the defense that the
tip was for a valid corporate purpose. As a corollary, the personal benefit test is
also an expression of the view that if a tipper did not receive a personal benefit
in exchange for the information, one should infer that the tip was provided for
a valid corporate purpose.44 The personal benefit test bars trading by some
insiders that appears to be socially beneficial. For example, it would be socially
beneficial for an insider to reveal that his company has committed accounting
39. Id. at 659.
40. Id. at 651-52 (noting that the SEC "[rlecogniz[edl ... that Dirks 'played an important role
in bringing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light"' (quoting 21 SEC Docket at 1412)).
41. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242
(2015) ("Efficient capital markets depend on the protection of property rights in
information. However, they also require that persons who acquire and act on
information about companies be able to profit from the information they generate...."
(quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J.,
concurring))).
42. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
43. Id. at 663-64 (articulating the personal benefit test).
44. Id. ("Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And
absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.").
70
The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test
69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 64 (2016)
fraud, but, under current doctrine, if the insider receives cash in exchange for
this tip, his tipping is criminal under the personal benefit test.
III. Salman and Judicial Confusion
In Salman, Maher Kara, who worked in the Citigroup healthcare
investment banking roup, tipped his older brother Mounir ("Michael") Kara,
who had become increasingly "more brazen and more persistent in his requests
for inside information."45 In the midst of these conversations between
brothers, Maher Kara, the tipping brother, became engaged to the sister of one
Bassam Salman, who got to know the family and became close friends with his
future brother-in-law, Michael Kara. Michael began giving the information he
got from his brother Maher to Salman, who traded on it in an account held in
the name of yet another relative. So, Maher Kara tipped his brother Michael,
who tipped Maher's future brother-in-law Salman.46
In his defense at trial, Salman argued that evidence of a friendship or
familial relationship between tipper and tippee standing alone is insufficient to
demonstrate that the tipper received a benefit absent evidence that the tipper
received a "personal benefit."47 This argument is clearly wrong as a matter of
law because the Supreme Court explicitly held in Dirks that a gift to a relative
satisfies the personal benefit est.48 As Judge Rakoff observed, a "personal
benefit is broadly defined to include not only pecuniary gain, but also, inter alia,
... the benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift of confidential
information to a trading relative or friend."49
The presence of the familial relationship in Salman and the absence of such
a relationship in Newman not only makes these cases easily reconcilable, it-
along with the absence of a consequential personal benefit in Salman-explains
why both cases were correctly decided.
45. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
899(2016).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1093. In Salman, Michael Kara, the tippee, in turn, tipped the defendant, Salman,
but the court did not confront the issue decided in United States v. Newman of whether
the government must prove that such a remote tippee had knowledge of the personal
benefit that the insider tipper received for disclosing inside information to the tipper.
773 F.3d 438, 450 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015). This is because the jury
in Salman "was instructed that it had to find that Salman 'knew that Maher Kara
personally benefitted in some way, directly or indirectly, from the disclosure of the
allegedly inside information to Mounir ("Michael") Kara."' 792 F.3d at 1091 n.2.
48. 463 U.S. at 664 (holding that a violation of the law occurs "when an insider makes a gift
of confidential information to a trading relative or friend").
49. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093-94 (alteration in original) (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452).
71
The Genius of the Personal Benefit Test
69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 64 (2016)
Conclusion
The inconsistencies that exist in the law of insider trading are not
inconsistencies among the federal courts, but are instead inconsistencies
between the executive branch and the judiciary. Both sides agree that insider
tippers receiving a personal benefit in exchange for providing material,
nonpublic information to a tippee is and should be illegal. The disagreement
lies in the opposing views about the legality of trading on a tip that is provided
by a tipper for no personal benefit, especially where the tip is made for a
legitimate business purposes, such as to disclose fraud or correct imperfections
in the market's pricing process. The government views such trading as illegal,
while the federal courts do not.
There is no reason for insider trading in general or the personal benefit
test in particular to be on the Supreme Court's agenda this term. Salman and
Newman are entirely consistent. The case that the Court will hear in October,
Salman, breaks no new ground and presents no issues that are either novel or
complex.
More generally the law of insider trading is very clear and very sensible
over a wide range of issues, notwithstanding the SEC and the Department of
Justice's arguments to the contrary. The government's objection to the status
quo as reflected in Dirks and Newman is not to the ambiguity of these decisions
but rather to the restraints they impose on the government's power and
prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, while it might have been best if the Court had
never granted certiorari in Salman, the Court can use its opinion in the case to
emphasize that the law of insider trading as it stands protects property rights
in information, promotes market efficiency, and protects costly and valuable
research by stock market analysts. The Court's current approach is not only
good law, it is also sound policy and economics.
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